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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model of exchange rate determination in which the forward premium
anomaly emerges as the result of unanticipated central bank interventions in the foreign exchange
market. Deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP) therefore represent neither unexploited
profit opportunities nor compensation for bearing risk. In simulations, the model generates a forward
premium anomaly and matches several other notable features of US-German data. Additional
empirical support is obtained from an analysis of Fed and Bundesbank interventions in the dollar--
DM market where it is found that the forward premium anomaly intensifies during those times when
a central bank intervenes.
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This paper studies an asset pricing anomaly in international ￿nance known as the forward
premium anomaly. This is the negative estimate of the slope in a regression of the future
exchange rate return on the forward premium (which is equivalent to the interest rate
di⁄erential by covered interest parity). Because uncovered interest parity (UIP) predicts
the slope to be 1, negative estimates are considered anomalous. A good deal of work has
been devoted to studying the forward premium anomaly but a satisfactory understanding
of the phenomenon continues to elude researchers.
We propose and investigate the idea that the forward premium anomaly is caused by
unanticipated central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market. In our setup,
UIP holds almost all the time and is violated only at those instances when an intervention
occurs. Our empirical work looks at the dollar-deutschemark rate and the dollar-yen rate
where frequent central bank interventions have taken place during our sample period. Our
emphasis on the surprise element of the interventions conforms to their irregular imple-
mentation and the absence of an o¢ cial exchange-rate target. Since market participants
cannot anticipate the interventions, the resulting deviations from UIP do not represent
unexploited pro￿t opportunities or compensation for bearing risk. Relatively few interven-
tions are required to produce the anomaly. Interventions that cause violations of UIP in as
little as 8 percent of the observations are su¢ cient to generate a forward premium anomaly
that matches the data.
We pursue this idea because standard theories of the foreign-exchange risk premium
that have been proposed to explain the forward premium anomaly have fared poorly when
confronted by the data. Here, we note that empirical investigations of the intertemporal
asset pricing model typically ￿nds that the covariance between the exchange-rate return
and consumption growth is insigni￿cant and much too small to explain the data. Empirical
assessments of the market CAPM come to similar conclusions with respect to the exchange-
rate and market portfolio returns. We mention also that there is little evidence to suggest
that excess returns predicted by the forward premium anomaly are economically signi￿-
cant. In studies that employ survey expectations, the ￿nding that the median expectation
from the survey implies a subjective risk premium of zero implies either the implied pro￿t
opportunities are ignored by traders, the risk to return trade-o⁄is su¢ ciently unattractive
to exploit, or that traders do not perceive that the anomaly exists.1
1There is an extensive literature that attempts to understand the deviations from UIP. Engel (1996),
Froot and Thaler (1990), Hodrick (1987), and Lewis(1995a) survey much of this literature. The ￿ndings
from survey expectations were ￿rst established by Froot and Frankel (1989). More recently, Mark and
Wu (1998) and Jeanne and Rose (2002) have studied the role of noise-trader risk in generating the forward
premium anomaly. Chinn and Merideth (1998) and Alexius (2001) report fragmentary evidence that UIP
holds over long horizons. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) ￿nd that the forward premium anomaly is con￿ned
2The paper begins by documenting features of the data that we seek to understand with
the primary focus on the forward premium anomaly. The anomaly, which is present in
both the dollar-deutschemark and dollar-yen data, is seen to intensi￿es when the monetary
authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market. For the deutschemark, we ￿nd that
the anomaly is present only during times of intervention. In nonintervention periods, the
forward premium is still a biased predictor of the future exchange-rate return but the
anomaly is not present. For the yen, the anomaly is present both during intervention and
nonintervention periods but is much stronger during interventions.
To try to understand these aspects of the data, we build a simple model of exchange
rate determination with central bank intervention. The basic model takes a continuous-time
representation of UIP in which the log exchange rate can be solved as an exact nonlinear
function of the interest di⁄erential. We then consider two alternative speci￿cations of
central bank interventions. The ￿rst is the Krugman (1992) intervention which occurs
at the margins of an (informal) exchange rate band. UIP holds continuously and also
in discretized observations if market participants have common and credible knowledge
of the intervention rule. This is an uninteresting case to consider, however, since the
model￿ s predictions do not match the data. The more interesting case to consider is where
interventions take the market by surprise as they would if plans are formulated in secret
and conducted irregularly so that intervention rules are not known by the public.2 Thus,
when interventions occur, they create an ephemeral but unexpected shift in the process
that governs the interest di⁄erential. UIP is violated only during these intervention points.
The time series is then composed of a mixture of observations (mostly) drawn from the UIP
urn and from the ￿ UIP is violated￿urn. When the future depreciation is regressed on the
interest di⁄erential, the occasional violations create negative slope coe¢ cient estimates.
The second speci￿cation allows the central bank to engage in inframarginal interven-
tions. Here, there are two possible intervention bands￿ a ￿rm outer band at which the
authorities will conduct a Krugman intervention and an interior band at which the author-
ities may or may not intervene. Here again, we are primarily interested model predictions
when the intervention rules are not known by market participants.
Related research includes Osterberg and Humpage (1992) and Baillie and Osterberg (1997b,
2000) who estimate the e⁄ects of intervention on deviations from UIP and LeBarron (1999),
Sapp (2004) and Neely (2002) who study the e⁄ects of intervention on technical trading rule
pro￿ts. These studies do not directly address the issue of the forward premium anomaly,
however. Interventions that a⁄ect the deviation from UIP are necessary but not su¢ cient
to explain the forward premium anomaly. The interventions must show a ￿lean against the
to G-7 economies and is absent in emerging market economies.
2Lewis (1995b) proposes an alternative to the target zone framework by modeling interventions to
stabilize the exchange rate around a targeted level where the probability of intervention depends upon and
is increasing in the gap between the current exchange rate and the target value.
3wind￿pattern and be e⁄ective in adjusting the exchange rate.
Although it is not the primary focus of the paper, we also point out that our model pro-
vides a framework for understanding volatility clustering observed in ￿nancial data. While
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) e⁄ects are commonly observed in
￿nancial returns data, little work has been done to understand its theoretical underpin-
nings. In our framework, endogenous ARCH e⁄ects emerge as the consequence of the
market equilibrium. In the exchange rate solution, innovations to the equilibrium exchange
rate depend on the squared interest di⁄erential which varies over time. As a result, the size
of the conditional variance of the exchange rate return varies over time.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the em-
pirical regularities of the international ￿nance data that we seek to understand. Section 2
presents our model of exchange-rate dynamics and central bank interventions. The quan-
titative assessment of the model is carried out by means of set of simulation experiments
with parameter values set equal to their simulated method of moments (SMM) estimates.
Section 3 discusses SMM estimation of model￿ s parameters and the results of the simula-
tion experiments are reported in section 4. Section 5 o⁄ers some concluding comments.
Derivations of the main results are contained in the appendix.
1 The data
The data are weekly observations of the spot exchange rate and one-week Eurocurrency
rates for the U.S., Germany, and Japan. U.S.￿ German observations begin on 1/6/76 and
extend through 12/25/98 which is one year before the deutschemark was irrevocably ￿xed to
the euro. U.S.-Japanese observations extend from 1/6/77 through 12/27/02. Observations
from 1/2/76 through 12/27/85 are Friday closings reported in the Harris Bank Weekly
Review. Observations from 1/3/86 through the end of the sample are Friday quotations
from Datastream.
1.1 Features of the data
Let st be the log dollar price of the foreign currency and rt be the corresponding 1-week
￿US￿ foreign￿Eurocurrency rate di⁄erential.4 Table 1 reports several features of the data
3The state dependence of the volatility in equilibrium returns is a common feature in general equilibrium
continuous time asset pricing e.g., Merton (1990). See also Den Haan and Spear (1998), who present a
theory in which volatility clustering in real interest rates are generated by business-cycle dependent ￿nancial
market frictions.
4Interest rates are stated in percent per annum. To conform to this normalization, the log exchange
rates are multiplied by 5200.
4that we seek to understand. We begin with the slope coe¢ cient in the regression
￿st+1 = ￿ + ￿rt + ￿t+1:
UIP predicts ￿ = 1. The literature refers to slope estimates that deviate from 1 as the
￿forward premium bias￿and negative estimates as the ￿forward premium anomaly￿• As can
be seen, the anomaly is present in both the dollar-deutschemark and dollar-yen data.
A Lagrange multiplier test for ￿rst-order ARCH in the regression residuals is highly
signi￿cant, indicating that exchange rate excess returns exhibit volatility clustering. Fitting
the conditional volatility in exchange rate excess returns to the GARCH(1,1) speci￿cation
Et￿
2
t+1 = ht = ! + ￿￿
2
t￿1 + ￿ht￿1;
yield estimates of ￿ and ￿ that are statistically signi￿cant.
To examine the relationship between the conditional exchange rate return variance and
the interest di⁄erential, we regress the conditional variance on the absolute value of the
interest di⁄erential
ht = a0 + a1jrtj + vt:
The point estimates show that conditional exchange rate variance is increasing in the mag-
nitude of the interest di⁄erential but the relationship is signi￿cant for the deutschemark
but not for the yen.
Finally, Table 1 reports sample standard deviations (￿￿st;￿r) and sample autocorre-
lations (￿￿st;￿r). We observe that exchange rate returns are highly volatile and exhibit
almost no serial correlation, the latter feature consistent with the popular random walk
characterization of the log exchange rate. In contrast, the interest di⁄erential is highly
serially correlated and is much smoother. Interest di⁄erential volatility is an order of mag-
nitude smaller than exchange-rate return volatility.5
1.2 Interventions and the forward-premium anomaly
We now incorporate data on Fed/Bundesbank interventions in the dollar￿ deutschemark
market and Fed/Bank of Japan interventions in the dollar-yen market to investigate the
connection between foreign exchange interventions and the forward premium anomaly.6 The
5Whether the interest di⁄erential is I(1) or I(0) has been heavily tested by testing whether the spot and
forward exchange rates are cointegrated. Evans and Lewis (1995) cannot reject that the interest di⁄erential
is I(1) whereas Baillie and Bollerslev (1989), Choudhry (1999), Corbae et al. (1992), Hai et al (1997), Luintel
and Paudyal (1998), Wu and Chen (1998) and Zivot (2000) do reject. Baillie and Bollerslev (1994) conclude
that the interest di⁄erential has long-memory but is mean reverting with a fractional di⁄erence parameter
between 1/2 and 1.
6We thank Kathryn Dominguez for the intervention data.
5German intervention data are daily indicators of whether the Bundesbank or the Fed had
bought or sold dollars for deutschemark. The Japanese intervention data are analogously
constructed for o¢ cial dollar-yen transactions. From these intervention data, we de￿ne
an intervention period to be one in which an intervention occurs within a window of time
around Friday (the day that our exchange rate and interest rate data are sampled). We
considered three intervention windows: i) a 5 day lead and lag window, ii) a 5 day lead
window, and iii) a 5 day lag window. We then sort the observations according to whether
they were drawn from an intervention period or from a nonintervention period and estimate
(1) for each sample. The results are shown in Table 2.
For the dollar-DM market over the full sample, there is no forward premium anomaly
in the absence of intervention. The point estimate of the slope slightly exceeds 1 during
non-intervention periods when using the lead and lag window de￿nition. The forward pre-
mium anomaly emerges during intervention periods. These results are robust to alternative
intervention window de￿nitions and the sub-sample analyses tell a similar story.
The results are a little less de￿nitive for the dollar-yen market. Here, the forward
premium anomaly is strong during intervention periods. The estimated slope is negative
during nonintervention periods but it is much smaller in magnitude and is only marginally
signi￿cantly less than 1. Similar ￿ndings are obtained in the subsample analyses. For
the dollar-yen rate, the forward premium anomaly is seen to intensify during intervention
periods.
What is the pattern for interventions? Are interventions more likely to occur when the
interest di⁄erential is large? To address these questions, we consider a latent model where
the central bank￿ s propensity to intervene y￿




t = ￿0 + ￿1jrtj + ut:
A central bank then intervenes yt = 1 (or does not yt = 0) if y￿







Probit estimation to the German data gives ^ ￿0 = ￿0:726;(t = ￿9:056) and ^ ￿1 =
0:208;(t = 9:500). According to these estimates, the likelihood of an intervention increases
with the size of the interest di⁄erential. Thus when the interest di⁄erential is large in
magnitude, conditional exchange rate return volatility and the likelihood of an intervention
is high. This pattern is consistent with the idea that the authorities engage in intervention
to guide the exchange rate towards a target value (lean against the wind) and to lower
market volatility (calm disorderly markets).7
7Baillie and Osterberg (1997a) and Dominguez (1998) ￿nd evidence that interventions are in part
motivated to reduce market volatility.
6Again, we ￿nd di⁄erences between the German and Japanese data. Fitting the probit to
the Japanese data yields ^ ￿0 = 0:046;(t = 0:691) and ^ ￿1 = ￿0:051;(t = ￿3:477): Here, the
likelihood of interventions in the dollar-yen market is high when the interest di⁄erential is
small. Looking at these results in conjunction with the insigni￿cant relationship between
exchange rate return volatility and the absolute value of the interest di⁄erential is consistent
with the idea that many of the interventions undertaken by the Bank of Japan are done
inframarginally.
To summarize, we ￿nd that the forward-premium anomaly is present in our data set.
The anomaly is present in the dollar-deutschemark market only when monetary authorities
intervene. While the anomaly is always present in the dollar-yen market, it intensi￿es
when the authorities intervene. Weekly exchange-rate excess returns exhibit ARCH e⁄ects,
are nearly serially uncorrelated and are much more volatile than the relatively persistent
interest di⁄erential. The probit estimates for the German data suggests that interventions
can be modeled as occurring at the margins whereas the probits for the Japanese data are
suggest that inframarginal interventions may be more appropriate.
2 Modeling interventions and the forward premium
anomaly
In this section, we present a simple model of the foreign exchange market to explain features
of the data discussed above.
2.1 Marginal interventions
Let r(t) be the instantaneous yield di⁄erential between domestic and foreign-currency de-
nominated debt instruments with identical default risk and let s(t) be the instantaneous
exchange rate. In continuous time, UIP is the ￿rst-order stochastic di⁄erential equation
Et[ds(t)] = r(t)dt; (1)
where Et(￿) is the expectation conditional on information available at instant t and ds(t)
is the forward di⁄erential of s(t).
To obtain an explicit solution, we make a standard assumption in the target-zone liter-
ature and assume that r(t) follows a regulated Brownian motion constrained to lie within
bands [r; ￿ r] where r < ￿ r. The existence of an informal set of bands (known to central
bankers if not the public) is motivated by the probit results in the previous section. When
r(t) lies strictly within the bands, it evolves according to the Brownian motion,
dr(t) = ￿rdz(t); (2)
7where dz(t) is a standard Wiener process and ￿r is the weekly volatility in dr(t). The regu-
lated Brownian motion generates high persistence in the interest di⁄erential with bounded
variance. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the re￿ ecting barriers are symmetric
(r = ￿￿ r).8
This is a variant of the Krugman (1992) target zone model. The main di⁄erence is that
Krugman￿ s model is based on a monetary model of the exchange rate that assumes UIP but
also relies on several additional relations (such as a stable money demand functions and
purchasing power parity). In his model, the monetary authorities intervene by adjusting a
set of vaguely de￿ned monetary fundamentals whereas in our speci￿cation, intervention is
accomplished by adjusting the interest di⁄erential. Marginal interventions occur whenever
r(t) = ￿ r or r(t) = ￿￿ r to prevent r(t) from exiting the bands. When r(t) lies within the
bands, we think of the authorities as focusing on domestic objectives so that the interest
di⁄erential, which is subject to many di⁄erent sources of shocks, evolves randomly.9
(1) and (3) admit the family of solutions,





where A and B are coe¢ cients to be determined by auxiliary conditions. A depends
on initial conditions and on currency units so without loss of generality, we set A = 0.
Figure 1 shows solutions for alternative values of B. The nonlinearity in the exchange
rate function with respect to the interest di⁄erential is qualitatively similar to Krugman￿ s
S-shape relationship between the exchange rate and the ￿ fundamentals.￿
Using Ito￿ s lemma to take the total di⁄erential of (3) gives the instantaneous deprecia-
tion








8Under band symmetry, the unconditional mean of r(t) is 0. The appendix shows how band symmetry
can be relaxed. Recent research has exploited similar nonlinear models to study exchange rates [Michael,
Nobay and Peel (1997), Kilian and Taylor (2001)]. Since interest di⁄erentials and exchange rates are
functionally related, it is natural to also consider nonlinear adjustment in the interest di⁄erential. We note
also that (2) is consistent with individual interest rate dynamics that evolve according to di(t) = ￿1dz1(t)
when i 2 [i;￿ {] and di￿(t) = ￿2dz2(t) when i￿ 2 [i￿;￿ {￿], where dzt(t) = ￿dz1(t) +
p
1 ￿ ￿2dw(t) and dw(t)
and dz1(t) are independent standard Wiener processes. Then we have dr(t) = di(t) ￿ di￿(t) = ￿rdz(t)
where ￿r =
p
(￿1 ￿ ￿￿2)2 + ￿2
2(1 ￿ ￿2), and dz(t) is a standard Wiener process. If we set i = i￿ = 0, then
we have ￿ r = ￿ { and r = ￿￿ {￿: In any ￿nite sample, however, we may not have very many realizations of the
event fit = ￿ {\i￿
t = i￿g or of the event fit = i\i￿
t = ￿ {￿g so the standard error on the estimate of ￿ r is likely
to be quite large.
9The idea that a monetary policy rule that depends on the exchange rate explains violations of UIP was
also examined by McCallum (1994). In his analysis, the authorities set the interest di⁄erential in response
to the currency depreciation rate.
8UIP holds regardless of the value of B as long as r(t) lies strictly within the band: This is
because dz(t) ￿ N(0;dt) so that taking expectations on both sides of (4), gives Et [ds(t)] =
r(t).10 If market participants know the intervention rule, then maintaining UIP at the
instant of intervention requires




To see why, suppose r hits the upper band r: At this instant, the authorities intervene
to prevent an exit from the band which causes the distribution of dz(t) to become right
truncated at zero with conditional mean E[dz(t)jr(t) = ￿ r] ’ ￿0:80. The restriction on B
ensures that the composite error term in (4) vanishes when r(t) = ￿ r.
We also point out that the instantaneous conditional variance of the composite error
term in (4), (B +r2(t)=￿2
r)2￿2
rdt; depends on the interest di⁄erential. The model generates
ARCH e⁄ects in exchange rate excess returns because this conditional variance will change
as r(t) varies in size.
Because UIP does not hold in the data, the restriction (5) is not a speci￿cation that we
take as a serious model for understanding the data. Instead, our primary interest will focus
on leaving B as a free parameter which we will estimate from the data. When agents do
not properly anticipate interventions, B 6= ￿r2=￿2
r.11 It follows that conditional on being
at the upper band (say), market participants believe ex ante that UIP will hold whereas
in truth, it is violated. At this instant, participant￿ s subjective conditional expectation of
ds(t) ￿ r(t) will deviate from the true expectation by the right hand side of








10We can entertain alternative intervention rules suggested in the target-zone literature. For example,
suppose participants believe that the authorities will intervene by setting the interest di⁄erential to 0
when one of the bands is hit, as in Flood and Garber (1991). Then maintaining UIP during instants of
intervention gives B = ￿ ￿ r
2
3￿2
r; where the coe¢ cient on r scaled down by 1=3. If the intervention rule lacks
full credibility in the sense of Bertola-Caballero (1992), the coe¢ cient is scaled down even further. In this
setup, we begin with an initial band [￿￿ r; ￿ r] of size b = 2￿ r. Suppose that when the upper band ￿ r is touched,
there is a probability p that the authorities will realign instead of defending the initial band. 1 ￿ p is the
probability that they defend the initial band. If realignment occurs, the authorities establish a new band
where the old upper band ￿ r is now the lower band and the new upper band is ￿ r + b and they place the
interest di⁄erential in the middle of the new band. If defense takes place, the authorities place the interest
di⁄erential back at the midpoint of the band as in the Flood-Garber intervention. In this environment,








11An alternative strategy for incorporating this idea would be to build a model of nonsystematic
interventions that are su¢ ciently irregular that agents maintain di⁄use priors over the interventions.
Dominguez (2003) provides a narrative account of Fed intervention policy and evidence on market dis-
covery of intervention episodes. See also Klein and Lewis (1993) who present a model in which market
participants update their prior probabilities about the interventions as Bayesian and learn about the bands
over time. An analysis of learning is beyond the scope of this paper.
9Notice that in order for the forward-premium anomaly to emerge from stabilizing (leaning
against the wind) interventions, the interest di⁄erential must appear negatively correlated
with the future depreciation. This will be the case if B > ￿￿ r2=￿2
r: We will refer to this as
the occasional violation (of UIP) speci￿cation because UIP holds except at ￿nitely many
instants.
2.1.1 Properties of discretized observations
Since our quantitative investigation of the model will involve discretizing the continu-
ous time observations to conform with the weekly data set, we discuss some theoret-
ical properties of the discretized observations. We begin by integrating (4) to obtain R 1
0 ds(t) = s(1) ￿ s(0) and rearranging to obtain




















































That ARCH e⁄ects are preserved can be seen by the interaction term r(0)￿(1): It is
also interesting to note that (7) conforms to the ￿big-news￿representation of Schotman et
al. (1997). Letting ￿t+1 and vt+1 be conditionally zero-mean innovations, they put forth
the parametric representation of UIP
st+1 ￿ st = rt(1 + ￿t+1) + vt+1;
calling the multiplicative error rt￿t+1 ￿big news￿and the additive error vt+1 ￿regular news.￿
They concluded that the forward premium anomaly may be a statistical artifact resulting
from poor sampling properties of the OLS estimator when the observations are generated
by this representation and where the interest di⁄erential is also drawn from a heavy-tailed
distribution.12
12Big news is not the only ingredient in the Schotman et al. story of poor small sample properties of
10From (7)-(9) the distribution of the big news is seen to be leptokurtotic. ARCH e⁄ects
are preserved under discretization as seen by the dependence of the conditional variance
of the big news component E0[r(0)2￿(1)2] on r(0). Several of the error components in (8)
and (9) have more familiar representations. The term labeled (i) is
R 1
0 dz(t) ￿ N(0;1); the
term labeled (ii) is
R 1
0 z(t)dz(t) ￿ ￿2(1) ￿ 1; which is skewed, and the term labeled (iii)
is
R 1





. The term labeled (iv) is
R 1
0 z2(t)dz(t) which is nonstandard. We
investigated its properties by simulation and ￿nd it to be zero-meaned with a symmetrically
leptokurtotic distribution (coe¢ cient of excess kurtosis equal to 86.56).
In conforming to our earlier analysis, we are interested in regressing the weekly depre-
ciation on the 1-week interest di⁄erential, R(0;1), and not on the instantaneous return
di⁄erential r(0). To do this, we appeal to the expectations hypothesis of the term structure
of interest rates, R(0;1) =Et(
R 1
0 r(u)du) = r(0)
R 1
0 du = r(0), the discretized representation
corresponds to the regression run on the data even though r(0) is the instantaneous yield.
2.2 Inframarginal interventions
Because the Bank of Japan evidently conducts interventions inframarginally, we consider
a modi￿cation of the model for interventions of this type. Here, we assume that there
is a ￿hard￿outer band [￿r;r] which if reached will trigger a Krugman-type intervention
with probability 1. There is also an inframarginal band [￿r1;r1] where jr1j < jrj which if
reached from ￿ within￿will elicit an intervention with some probability p < 1: The bands
are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Soft inframarginal and hard outer bands.
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The following discussion pertains to the upper bands. The treatment of the symmetric
lower bands should be obvious. As r approaches r1 from below, the authorities engage in a
variant of Bertola-Cabellero intervention. If an intervention occurs, the interest di⁄erential
is set to ￿1r1; where 0 < ￿1 < 1: If the inframarginal band is ￿abandoned,￿the authorities
OLS. They also assume that the interest di⁄erential is drawn from a leptokurtotic distribution. In work
along similar lines, Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) demonstrate that the inter 90-percentile range of the OLS
empirical distribution from regressing the exchange rate return on the interest di⁄erential is (-5.14,10.9)
when the conditional volatility in the interest di⁄erential follows their calibrated fractionally integrated
generalized ARCH process.
11set the interest di⁄erential to ￿2 r1; where ￿2 > 1 This two-sided discrete change in r allows
identi￿cation of the parameters parameters under common knowledge of the intervention
rule. Since the properties of the model will be investigated by simulation, the empirical
predictions from the model we can set ￿2 in￿nitesimally greater than 1 to approximate
what would happen if there is no action by the authorities if they decline to intervene at
r1:
There are two solutions depending on whether the interest di⁄erential lies inside (region
￿3) or outside (region ￿2) of the inframarginal band: They are
s(t) =
(
G1(r) = B1r + r3
3￿2 if r 2 ￿3
G2(r) = A2 + B2r + r3







2) ￿ 1 + ￿3
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A2 = (B1 ￿ B2)￿2r1:
B2 is obtained from the marginal intervention solution and A2 glues the exchange rate
path from region ￿1 to ￿2 to eliminate jumps. The solution is illustrated in Figure 3 for
￿1 = 0:99;￿2 = 1:001;p = 0:3; jr1j = 0:05 and jrj = 0:10:
When the intervention rule is not known by market participants, violations of UIP will
occur at each of the intervention points. Treatment of this case proceeds as discussed above
with a single solution and using B estimated from the data.
3 Simulated method of moments estimation of the
model parameters
We estimate the parameters (￿ r;￿r) of the interest rate processes for the marginal interven-
tions model using the simulated method of moments (SMM).13 To do so, we divide each of
the T weekly observations into N subintervals, of length ￿N = 1=N ’ dt, and use Euler￿ s
method to approximate the continuous-time model
rj = rj￿1 + ￿r￿j
p
￿N; (10)
where j = 1;:::;NT, ￿j
iid ￿ N(0;1), and ￿r is the weekly standard deviation of the in-
stantaneous rate of return di⁄erential r(t). The parameters ￿ r and ￿r are chosen such that
13Lee and Ingram (1991), Du¢ e and Singleton (1993).
12the implied moments generated from simulations of (10) minimize a measure of quadratic
distance between the set of simulated and sample moments.
Using the 3 moments E(￿rt;￿r2
t;rtrt￿1); for the U.S.-German case we obtain estimated
values of ^ ￿r = 0:576 (s.e.=0.070), ^ ￿ r = 5:632 (s.e.=0.643). The J-statistic for the chi-square
test of the over identifying restrictions is 0.008 which with one degree of freedom gives a
p-value of 0.930 and is not rejected by the data. For the U.S.-Japanese case, we obtain
^ ￿r = 0:817 (s.e.=0.135), ^ ￿ r = 5:221 (s.e.=0.531). The J-statistic for the chi-square test of
the over identifying restrictions is 0.066 which with one degree of freedom gives a p-value
of 0.797.
In the simulation work conducted below, the UIP model uses the parameter estimates
^ ￿ r and ^ ￿r and assumes B = ￿^ ￿ r2=^ ￿
2
r: Simulations of the occasional violations model will
not impose this condition but will employ values of B estimated directly from the data.
To do this, we apply the Euler method to the exchange rate (3) and do SMM estimation
using the moments (E￿st;E￿s2
t;E￿strt￿1). For the U.S. German case, we obtain ^ B = 102
(s.e.=6.11). The positive point estimate is evidence against the hypothesis that UIP holds
at intervention points. Although carrying out classical hypothesis tests of the model are not
our primary interest, we note that tests of the over identifying restrictions are somewhat
unfavorable to the model (J=43, p-value=0.00). For the U.S.-Japanese case, we obtain
b B = 98:4 (s.e.=4.94) with J=104, p-value=0.00.
Calibration of the inframarginal intervention model will achieved using less formal meth-
ods.
4 Quantitative properties of the model
We now investigate the quantitative ability for the model to account for the data. We
conduct 5000 model simulations with the calibrated model. Each simulation begins with
a realization of the Euler￿ approximated continuous-time interest di⁄erential and exchange
rate with the weekly time interval divided into 84 subintervals. The initial value of the
interest di⁄erential is drawn from the uniform distribution with support [￿￿ r; ￿ r]. We then
draw observations at weekly intervals that conforms to the number of data points in the
sample. The simulated observations are then employed to calculate the statistics that were
used to characterize the data.
4.1 Marginal interventions
Table 3 shows median values of the statistic in question and the inter-95 percentile range
(in parentheses) for the model generated under marginal interventions. The model for
the interest di⁄erential is seen to do a good job of matching the sample moments. To
13benchmark our ￿ndings, we also show results, under the UIP heading, generated under
common knowledge of the intervention rule. This model is counterfactual in that it does
not generate a forward-premium bias, the conditional variance of exchange-rate returns
shows the wrong relationship with the size of the interest di⁄erential, and the exchange
rate return is not volatile enough.
When UIP is occasionally violated, the model generates a pronounced forward premium
anomaly. For both the deutschemark and the yen, the inter-95-percentile range of b ￿ lies
below the point estimate from the data. We observe strong ARCH e⁄ects with the inter
95-percentile of the LM statistic distribution lies above the point estimate from the data.
The implied GARCH(1,1) process matches the data for the deutschemark but misses for the
yen (implied ￿ is too small and implied ￿ is too large). The model matches the volatility in
the exchange rate return and the interest di⁄erential, which are vastly di⁄erent from each
other. The simulations also capture the strong positive relation between the conditional
variance ht+1 of the exchange-rate return and the magnitude of the interest di⁄erential jrtj
for the deutschemark and re￿ ects the more tenuous relationship between these variables
for the yen.14
How frequently do these violations occur in producing these results? Based upon the
dollar-deutschemark estimated model and a weekly sampling interval of the observations,
the unconditional probability of touching either of the bands is 0.081. Over the course of
a sample of 23 years, this amounts to interventions in approximately 98 out of the total
1200 weekly observations.
4.2 Inframarginal interventions
The parameters to be set are r;r1;p;￿1 ; and ￿2 : For the dollar-DM market, the maximal
interest di⁄erential observed is 12.31%, which leads us to set r = 12: Since 86 percent of the
interventions occurred while jrj ￿ 6%. These ￿ inframarginal￿interventions accounted for
34.5 percent of the weekly observations leading us to set r1 = 6 and p = 0:345: Analogous
calculations for Japan lead us to set r = 12; r1 = 6 , p = 0:4: We set ￿1 = 0:99 and ￿2
= 1:001 for both markets.
Simulation results are displayed in Table 4. To benchmark our ￿ndings, the results under
the UIP heading are generated under common knowledge of the intervention rule. When
UIP holds, the GARCH model again looks reasonable but overall, the implied volatility
of exchange rate returns is too small. The relation between conditional exchange rate
14The heightened volatility associated with large U.S.-German interest di⁄erentials and interven-
tion points predicted by the occasional violations model is consistent with empirical ￿ndings of
Dominguez (1989) and others who ￿nd that heightened exchange rate volatility shortly following central
bank interventions.
14volatility and the interest di⁄erential doesn￿ t match the data for the dollar-DM rate but
provides a better match for the dollar-yen rate.
When interventions are surprise events, the model matches the forward premium anom-
aly for both the DM and yen rates. This model generates unconditional volatility of ex-
change rate returns that are close to the data. The implied GARCH (1,1) process does not
match the yen volatility, however.
4.3 Comparison of marginal and inframarginal interventions with
occasional violations
When interventions are surprises, both speci￿cations of interventions are able to explain
the forward premium anomaly. The anomaly is slightly attenuated under inframarginal
interventions. Both speci￿cations are able to qualitatively explain the main features of the
data. In general, the implied di⁄erence in the properties of the observations between the
marginal and inframarginal intervention models is not great. The implied GARCH(1,1)
structure of exchange return excess volatility is also very similar across the models. In-
framarginal interventions create somewhat higher unconditional exchange rate volatility.
The implied relationship between exchange rate volatility and the interest di⁄erential in
the inframarginal model is stronger and more systematic than that found in the data.
5 Conclusion
The forward premium anomaly has long confounded researchers. The dominant approaches
taken in the literature towards understanding this phenomenon are either that the anomaly
is induced by a time-varying foreign exchange risk premium or that the anomaly signi￿es
some sort of market ine¢ ciency. Neither approach, however, has very high explanatory
power.
The explanation o⁄ered in this paper, that the anomaly is induced by unanticipated
central bank interventions in foreign exchange, is new. We put forth a simple model in
which the forward premium anomaly emerges as a result of unanticipated central bank
interventions in the foreign exchange market. In this model, the violations to UIP do not
re￿ ect unexploited pro￿t opportunities or systematic risk. By this reasoning, the forward
premium anomaly represents neither unexploited pro￿t opportunities nor compensation for
risk bearing. Instead, it arises due to momentary model misspeci￿cations at the time of
intervention. A direct analysis of the data and simulations of the theoretical model provide
empirical support for this explanation. The data shows that the forward premium anomaly
intensi￿es during periods in which central banks are intervening which suggests that the
interventions themselves may be the source of the anomaly. Simulations of the model show
15that it is able to quantitatively match the foreign premium anomaly as well as many other
notable properties of the data.
16Table 1: Features of weekly exchange rate and euro-deposit rates
US-Germany US-Japan
￿st+1 = ￿ + ￿rt + ￿t+1
b ￿ -0.693 -2.498
t-ratio (￿ = 1) -2.024 -4.920
LM test for ARCH(1): ￿2(1) 281.832 135.812
GARCH(1,1): ht+1 = ! + ￿￿2
t + ￿ht
b ￿ 0.080 0.129
(ase) (0.014) (0.016)
b ￿ 0.914 0.682
(ase) (0.035) (0.029)
ht+1 = a0 + a1jrtj + vt











Notes: Log exchange rates multiplied by 5200. Interest rate di⁄erential in
percent per year.
17Table 2. Interventions and the forward premium anomaly
Deutschemark
Interventions No Interventions
Lead/Lag Lead Lag Lead/Lag Lead Lag
Sample: 1977-1998
￿ -1.591 -2.183 -2.346 1.195 1.130 1.601
t-ratio -2.110 -2.255 -2.380 0.147 0.111 0.506
Nobs 632 553 552 520 599 600
Sample: 1977-1991
￿ -2.179 -2.788 -2.340 0.242 0.363 0.894
t-ratio -2.112 -2.252 -2.042 -0.317 -0.329 -0.053
Nobs 592 531 530 194 255 256
Sample: 1992-1998
￿ -4.198 -7.630 -3.896 0.711 0.652 0.671
t-ratio -1.377 -2.011 -0.879 -0.184 -0.231 -0.220
Nobs 40 22 22 326 344 344
Yen
Interventions No Interventions
Lead/Lag Lead Lag Lead/Lag Lead Lag
Sample: 1978-2002
￿ -4.945 -5.694 -4.413 -0.584 -0.745 -1.485
t-ratio -4.978 -4.914 -4.098 -1.778 -2.114 -2.847
Nobs 536 471 472 528 593 592
Sample: 1978-1993
￿ -4.707 -5.762 -4.020 -0.379 -0.316 -1.412
t-ratio -4.784 -4.970 -3.773 -1.531 -1.565 -2.740
Nobs 468 423 424 319 364 363
Sample: 1993-2002
￿ -15.149 -7.657 -19.675 0.730 -0.791 -1.128
t-ratio -1.854 -0.714 -2.491 -0.081 -0.547 -0.616
Nobs 67 47 48 209 229 228
18Table 3: Properties of calibrated models under marginal interventions.
Median and inter-95 percentile range. 5000 replications of weekly observations
U.S.-Germany U.S.-Japan
UIP Occasional violation UIP Occasional violation
￿st+1 = ￿ + ￿rt + "t+1
￿ 1.105 -2.156 1.006 -3.831
(0.670: 2.104) (-4.02: -1.565) (0.730: 1.450) (-5.236: -3.032)
t-ratio 0.399 -4.156 0.039 -5.814
(-1.732: 2.511) (-5.238: -3.793) (-2.050: 2.156) (-6.467: -5.387 )
ARCH: ￿2(1) 299.27 366.26 299.97 393.378
(242.74: 352.05) (321.61: 405.47) (251.262: 346.81) (354.70: 428.87)
GARCH(1,1):ht+1 = ! + ￿￿2
t + ￿ht
￿ 0.156 0.019 0.128 0.007
(0.074: 0.288) (0.008: 0.034) (0.036: 0.287) (0.003: 0.018)
￿ 0.834 0.977 0.833 0.991
(0.724: 0.910) (0.942: 0.991) (0.653: 0.941) (0.980: 0.996)
ht+1 = a0 + a1jrtj + vt
a1 -423.35 634.22 -114.73 108.03
(-400.25: -349.32) (445.38: 838.08) (-141.99: -87.83) (-138.22 : 369.25)
t-ratio -26.630 15.112 -17.791 1.839
(-32.755: -20.496) (10.184: 209.385) (-22.436: -13.540) (-2.297: 6.323)
R2 0.8029 0.8316 0.829 0.848
(0.759: 0.836) (0.799: 0.857) (0.797 : 0.856) (0.822: 0.868)
Exchange Rate
￿￿s 39.912 74.912 24.038 86.665
(34.503: 44.675) (69.858: 79.798) (21.825: 26.046) (83.116: 90.372)
￿￿s(1) -0.007 -0.004 -0.014 -0.049
(-0.072: 0.061) (-0.070: 0.064) (-0.081: 0.052 ) (-0.107: 0.009)
Interest di⁄erential
￿r 3.088 3.088 2.973 2.973
(2.270: 3.628) (2.270: 3.628) (2.560: 3.278 ) (2.560: 3.278)
￿r(1) 0.983 0.983 0.965 0.965
(0.969: 0.989) (0.969: 0.989) (0.952: 0.973 ) (0.952: 0.973)
￿r(12) 0.828 0.828 0.673 0.673
(0.682: 0.896) (0.682: 0.896) (0.543: 0.769) (0.543: 0.769)
￿r(24) 0.688 0.688 0.453 0.453
(0.447: 0.819) (0.447: 0.819) (0.239: 0.629) (0.239: 0.629)
Note: Bold numbers indicate that the data lies outside the inter-95 percentile range. 19Table 4: Properties of calibrated models under inframarginal interventions.
Median and inter-95 percentile range. 5000 replications of weekly observations
U.S.-Germany U.S.-Japan
UIP Occasional violation UIP Occasional violation
￿st+1 = ￿ + ￿rt + "t+1
￿ 1.056 -1.855 1.021 -2.801
(0.396: 2.225) (-3.644: -0.836) (0.513: 1.696 ) (-4.419: -1.511)
t-ratio 0.114 -2.853 0.060 -3.735
(-1.704: 1.996) (-4.425: -1.789) (-1.865: 1.885 ) (-5.447: -2.809)
ARCH: ￿2(1) 205.98 267.55 205.22 303.54
(116.11: 331.18 ) (156.23: 147.93) (121.76: 316.09) (218.55: 389.65)
GARCH(1,1):ht+1 = ! + ￿￿2
t + ￿ht
￿ 0.188 0.081 0.174 0.062
(0.067: 0.379 ) (0.034: 0.134) (0.074: 0.333) (0.015: 0.113)
￿ 0.712 0.891 0.666 0.892
(0.508: 0.875) (0.843: 0.937) (0.426: 0.829) (0.833: 0.939)
ht+1 = a0 + a1jrtj + vt
a1 243.12 2204 77.73 1219
(-361.20: 778.52) (731: 4577) (-76.3279: 189.90) (310: 2213)
t-ratio 6.56 34.06 6.74 27.81
(-18.11: 15.48) (19.16: 56.66) (-8.60: 12.80) (9.44: 50.37)
R2 0.56 0.84 0.74 0.91
(0.43: 0.86) (0.72: 0.93) (0.61: 0.90) (0.85: 0.96)
Exchange Rate
￿￿s 56.31 91.73 39.402 99.492
(46.44: 72.33) (74.31: 147.93) (33.92: 47.12) (88.19: 123.60)
￿￿s(1) -0.006 -0.036 -0.009 -0.049
(-0.092: 0.085) (-0.115: 0.043 ) (-0.094: 0.074) (-0.120: 0.019 )
Interest di⁄erential
￿r 3.650 3.650 3.759 3.759
(2.517: 5.691) (2.517: 5.691) (2.888: 5.406) (2.888: 5.406 )
￿r(1) 0.988 0.988 0.976 0.976
(0.974: 0.995) (0.974: 0.995) (0.960: 0.989) (0.960: 0.989)
￿r(12) 0.868 0.868 0.766 0.766
(0.723: 0.953) (0.723: 0.953) (0.603: 0.891) (0.603: 0.891)
￿r(24) 0.756 0.756 0.588 0.588
(0.503: 0.912) (0.503: 0.912) (0.329: 0.804) (0.329: 0.804)
Note: Bold numbers indicate that the data lies outside the inter-95 percentile range.
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Figure 3. Common-knowledge solution under inframarginal intervention (solid black line)
26Appendix
A.1 Exchange rate solution
We ￿rst derive the solution under marginal interventions following Krugman￿ s (1992) use
of the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. We guess that the solution takes the form,
s(t) = G[r(t)]; (A.1)
where G(￿) is a time-invariant continuous and twice di⁄erentiable function of r. Using Ito￿ s








where G0 = dG(r)=dr and G00 = d2G(r)=dr2:
Derivation of eq.(3). If the interest di⁄erential evolves according to (2), then dr(t) =
￿rdz(t) and dr(t)2 = ￿2





















00[r(t)] = r(t): (A.4)
Let the solution to the homogeneous part of (A.4) be Gh. It must be the case that G00
h = 0
which is satis￿ed by setting Gh = A + Br. Next, guess that the solution to the nonhomo-
geneous part is Gn = kr3. Then G0
n = 3kr2;G00
n = 6kr. Upon substitution into (A.4), we
obtain k = 1=3￿2




Derivation of restriction B = ￿￿ r2=￿2
r under the no UIP violations speci￿cation. Here,
we exploit knowledge of behavior at the bands to determine B. Due to the symmetric
nature of the bands, we need only examine behavior at one of the bands. Suppose that
27r(t) attains the upper band ￿ r. At that instant, G0[￿ r] = 0 = B + ￿ r2=￿2
r and solving yields
B = ￿(￿ r2=￿2
r). k
Derivation of B for Flood-Garber interventions. As above, the solution to the nonhomo-
geneous part of the di⁄erential equation is given by Gn = r3=(3￿2
r). Writing the guess
solution explicitly in terms of the bands gives




+ B(r ￿ ￿ r) + C(r + ￿ r): (A.5)
Now suppose the upper band is hit at the instant t0, r(t0) = ￿ r, it follows that




+ 2C￿ r: (A.6)
At the next instant, the interest di⁄erential is set to 0. Since these actions are known with
certainty, we have,
s(t0 + dt) = Ets(t0 + dt) = G(0j￿ r) = A + (C ￿ B)￿ r: (A.7)
Ruling out arbitrage pro￿ts requires that s(t0 + dt) = s(t0). Thus equating (A.6) and
(A.7) gives (B + C) = ￿￿ r2=(3￿2
r). Due to the symmetry of the bands, we have B = C =
￿￿ r2=(6￿2
r). Substituting back into (A.5) gives,










Derivation of B for Bertola-Caballero interventions. Again, begin by writing the guess
solution explicitly in terms of the bands. The authorities defend with probability 1 ￿ p: If
a defense is mounted, the interest di⁄erential is reset to 0. We require Br = b1 (r ￿ r) +
b2 (r ￿ r) which gives b1 = ￿B=2; b2 = B=2. We will write the solution as





where C = B=2 and r = ￿￿ r: Now suppose that the upper band ￿ r is attained at instant t0.
Then





At the next instant,
s(t0 + dt) =
(
G(0jr; ￿ r) = A + 2Cr if defend w.p 1 ￿ p
G(2rj3r;r) = A +
(2￿ r)3
3￿2
r if abandon w.p. p
:












+ (1 ￿ p)[A + 2Cr];












Derivation of (7). We begin with (4) which, for convenience, we reproduce here as


























































2(0) ￿ 2z(0)z(t)] + 2r(0)￿r[z(t) ￿ z(0)] (A.11)
























































29Now for part (c), we simply note that B￿r
R 1
0 dz(t) = B￿r[z(1)￿z(0)]. Substitute these
expressions back into (A.9) to get
s(1) ￿ s(0) = r(0) + ￿r
Z 1
0












































Decomposing ￿(1) into terms that depend on r(0) and those that do not gives ￿(1) =
r(0)￿(1) + v(1) where ￿(1) is given by (8) and v(1) is given by (9). k
Asymmetric Bands. The symmetric band assumption is not key and can be relaxed. Here,
we derive the exchange rate solution when r = ￿￿￿ r. As above, the solution to the nonho-
mogeneous part of the di⁄erential equation is Gn = r3=(3￿2
r). We write the general guess
solution explicitly in terms as




+ B[￿ r + r(t)=￿] + C[r + ￿r(t)]: (A.12)
At r(t) = ￿ r,




+ B[￿ r + ￿ r=￿]; (A.13)
and
G




















Similarly, at r(t) = r,




+ C[r + ￿r]; (A.16)
and
G























Inframarginal interventions. We know that the general exchange rate solution is
s = G(r) = A + Br +
r3
3￿2:
The hard outer band is [￿r;r] and the inframarginal intervention point is r1. Looking at






In order to identify the parameters, we model a discrete inframarginal intervention. As r
approaches r1 from below, there is probability p that the bank will intervene. If it does, it
will set the interest di⁄erential to ￿1 r1; where 0 < ￿1 < 1: If it does not intervene, it will




G1(r) = A1 + B1r +
￿3
1r3
3￿2 if r 2 ￿1
G2(r) = A2 + B2r +
￿3
2r3
3￿2 if r 2 ￿2
:
For r 2 ￿1; we know we can set A1 = 0 due to symmetry of the intervention rule. At the
instant that r1 is hit, the exchange rate is s(t) = G1(r1): In the next instant,
s(t + dt) =
(









3￿2 w.p. 1 ￿ p
:
The zero-arbitrage pro￿ts condition is that there are no ex ante jumps in the exchange





2) ￿ 1 + ￿3
2





if agents know the rule. If the intervention occurs, the exchange rate continues to be
governed by G1: If it does not occur, the interest di⁄erential passes to region ￿2 where
exchange rate is governed by










A2 = (B1 ￿ B2)￿2r1
31The expression for B2 comes from the marginal intervention solution and A2 is set in this
fashion to glue the exchange rate together to eliminate jumps.
Due to the kink in the exchange rate path, a neutral adjustment (an intervention where
UIP holds) needs to occur if re-entering region ￿1 from ￿2: The re-entry intervention is
speci￿ed as an inframarginal intervention where UIP holds even in the occasional violations
speci￿cation.
A.2 Simulated method of moments estimation
Let the simulated observations be denoted with a ￿ tilde.￿ For the discretized regulated
Brownian motion we divided each of the T = 1200 weekly time periods into N = 14
subintervals. Experimentation using N = 7 and N = 21 subintervals produced little
di⁄erences in the results. Setting ￿N = (1=N) ’ dt; we simulate sequences of (10) by









r if ~ rt￿1 < r
~ rj if r ￿ ~ rj ￿ ￿ r
￿ r if ~ rt￿1 > ￿ r
for j = 1;:::;NMT. The observations were then re-sampled at weekly intervals giving us
a sequence of MT weekly observations (we use M = 30).
SMM estimation of this model proceeds as follows. Let ￿ be the vector of parameters
to be estimated, r0 = (r1;r2;:::;rT) denote the collection of the actual time-series observa-
tions, and f~ ri(￿)gM
i=1 be the computer simulated time-series of length M which we generate
according to (A.19). ~ r0(￿) = (~ r1(￿); ~ r2(￿);:::; ~ rM(￿)) denotes the collection of these M
observations. To estimate ￿r and ￿ r by matching E(￿rt);E(￿rt)2; and E(rtrt￿1), we let the
vector function of the data from which to simulate the moments be h(rt) = (rt;r2
t;rtrt￿1)0
and the vector of sample moments be HT(r) = 1
T
PT
t=1 h(rt). The corresponding vector
of simulated moments is HM(~ r(￿)) = 1
M
PM
i=1 h(~ ri(￿)), where the length of the simu-
lated series is M. Now let ut = h(rt) ￿ HT(r) be the deviation of h from its mean,














T )(^ ￿j + ^ ￿0
j) is the Newey
and West (1987) estimate of the long-run covariance matrix of ut.
If we let g
T;M(￿) = HT(r) ￿ HM(~ r(￿)) be the deviation of the sample moments from
the simulated moments, then the SMM estimator, ^ ￿
S, is that value of ￿ that minimizes





























￿￿1 and B = E@h[~ qj(￿)]
@￿ .
We estimated ￿ r and ￿r by doing a grid search over ￿ r 2 [2:0;15:0] and minimizing with
respect to ￿r for each candidate value of ￿ r.
33